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V iolence in central america has grown so much in the last half decade that colombia is 
no longer the homicide capital of the region. in fact, it 
now ranks fourth in that ignominious distinction behind 
el Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.1 the violence is 
mostly due to the phenomenon of street gangs, also called 
pandillas or gangas, but most often maras. they have 
grown in number, sophistication, and stature and have 
largely overwhelmed the security forces of central amer-
ica’s fledgling democracies. Altogether, these maras represent 
a significant threat to the security of the countries in the region. 
numerous national, binational, multinational, regional, and hemi-
spheric conferences have sought to address the problem.
Origins of the Maras 
The maras emerged from conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua during the 1980s. Thousands of people fled north, including 
a large number of young men who had fought on the governments’ side 
or with the insurgents. many of these young men went to los angeles, 
but because they were poorly educated, few were able to find work. In 
a city already structured in terms of gangs, their familiarity with guns 
and armed combat was their one advantage. Some were incorporated into 
such neighborhood gangs as the african–american crips and Bloods; the 
Mexican-American, illegal-immigrant gang EME; and the Mexican Mafia. 
Some of the men, especially those from el Salvador, joined the multi-ethnic 
18th Street Gang. other Salvadorans founded the Mara Salvatrucha (Group 
of Smart, or savvy, Salvadorans) 13, or MS-13, to compete with the 18th 
Street Gang because they believed the Salvadorans in that gang were traitors.2 
(the new gang gave itself the number 13, as in 13th Street, where many 
Salvadorans had settled.) as most of what the maras were (and are) involved 
in was criminal activity, they were arrested and put into prison, where they 
further defined their gang identities and honed their criminal skills. 
When federal anti-immigration laws toughened and the civil conflicts in El 
Salvador and Guatemala ended, many gang members were deported to their 
countries of origin as soon as their prison sentences ended.3 once they returned 
to San Salvador, Guatemala city, or San Pedro Sula, the maras established 
themselves in the countries’ war-torn societies. Clicas (cliques, cells, or groups) 
deported from the United States established mS-13 in San Salvador in 1992, 
replacing less violent and less sophisticated gangs. the 18th Street Gang 
became m-18 and was established in el Salvador in 1996 with three clicas.
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Location, organization, and numbers. el Sal-
vador’s national Police (Pnc) say there are 36,000 
gang members in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 
11,000 in el Salvador, 4,500 in nicaragua, 2,700 
in costa rica, 1,400 in Panama, and 100 in Belize. 
that’s nearly 70,000 in the region.4 in addition to 
mS-13 and m-18, there are Los Cholos (the Half 
Breeds), Los Nicas (the nicaraguans), and Los Batos 
Locos (the crazy Boys) in Guatemala; La Mau Mau 
(derived from the name of rebels in Kenya and a 
new York gang in the 1950s) and La Maquina (the 
machine) in el Salvador; La Mau Mau, Los Batos 
Locos, and Los Rockeros (the rockers) in Honduras; 
and the Gerber Boys and Los Charly in nicaragua.5 
the maras are not just a central american 
phenomenon; they are transnational. mS-13, for 
example, reportedly has 20,000 members in the 
United States, 4,000 members in canada, and a 
large presence in mexico.6 The numbers fluctu-
ate—mara membership being dynamic, and gang 
membership is difficult to gauge.
mara organizational structures are elaborate, 
flexible, and redundant. A leadership cadre often 
has another cadre to back it up. the maras can 
function as networks, with extensive transnational 
linkages. they have internal functional branches 
specializing in recruiting; logistics; attacks; intel-
ligence collection and propaganda; and murder, 
drug trafficking, and extortion. Figure 1 depicts a 
typical organizational diagram.
Behavior. the national police in el Salvador 
say maras are involved in selling drugs; extortion; 
prostitution; homicide; and illegal movement of 
drugs, people, and arms across borders.7 they 
increasingly arm their members with heavier 
weapons, including m-16s, aK-47s, and grenades, 
which the mara are reportedly improving their 
skills at using.
there is much more that is disturbing about 
the maras. They define themselves in contrast to 
the rest of society and to other gangs by wearing 
unique tattoos, using their own symbols and graf-
fiti, and communicating through a special language 
and unique hand signals. each mara has its own 
elaborate internal rules as to when a gang member 
can fight, what the punishment will be for certain 
behaviors, and what is required if a fellow clica 
member is killed. the use of violence is prob-
ably the most defining characteristic of the maras. 
indeed, their unique vocabularies emphasize brutal-
ity and criminal activity. initiation, ascension into 
leadership positions, and discipline are all based on 
violence. to enter the mS-13 mara, for example, a 
prospective gang member must agree to be beaten 
for 13 seconds by 4 members of the gang without 
putting up any resistance and protecting only his 
face and genitals. later, as part of the ascension 
process, new members have to kill a person for no 
other reason than to show they can. this is called 
sangre afuera, sangre adentro (blood outside, 
blood inside). if women are strong enough, they 
undergo the same initiation rite. if not, they have 
to have sex with all the male members of the mara. 






















Figure 1. Mara structure
Source: PNC El Salvador
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authorities, but against each other for turf, 
markets, and especially for drugs. as part of 
their aggressiveness, some gangs mutilate 
and decapitate their victims.
Responding to the Maras
each country in the region has responded 
in different ways to the mara problem. in 
2003, Honduran President ricardo maduro 
forced a change in his country’s penal code, 
establishing a maximum 12-year prison 
sentence for gang membership. Soon after, 
he increased the sentence to 30 years and 
put the army on the street to back up the 
nation’s 8,000 police officers.8 
in el Salvador, President tony Saca 
pushed anti-gang legislation known as Super Mano 
Dura (Super Hard Hand) through congress.9 Sal-
vadoran authorities now arrest youths simply for 
having gang-related tattoos or flashing signs, and 
gang members serve up to five years in prison (gang 
leaders up to nine). additionally, San Salvador and 
Washington have developed an exchange program 
between PNC and FBI personnel, and El Salvador 
has developed some rehabilitation and prevention 
programs (with questionable success).
President oscar Berger and the Guatemalan 
congress have also approved new anti-gang laws, 
although these are not as draconian as the ones 
adopted in Honduras and El Salvador. Four thou-
sand reserve army troops now support a government 
presence in troubled neighborhoods in Guatemala 
city, and a new interior minister’s sole purpose is 
to fight crime. Guatemala has also instituted some 
programs aimed at preventing crime and assisting 
at-risk youths, especially former gang members.10 
in contrast to Mano Dura, President martin tor-
rijos of Panama launched Mano Amiga (Friendly 
Hand) to offer at-risk youths positive alternatives 
to gang membership. the program seeks to provide 
access to theater and sports activities for some 
10,000 Panamanian youths.11
in addition to these national efforts, many bilat-
eral, multilateral, and regional efforts aim to combat 
the maras. For example, Berger and Vicente Fox, 
mexico’s president, agreed to establish mechanisms 
to fight mara drug trafficking along their border. 
Similarly, Berger and el Salvador’s Saca agreed to 
set up a joint security force to patrol gang activity 
along their border. in January 2004, Guatemalan, 
Salvadoran, Honduran, nicaraguan, and Dominican 
Republic officials created a database on crimes to 
better track movements of criminal organizations. 
Saca proposed a “Plan centroamerica Segura” 
(central american Security Plan) to the central 
american integration System (in Spanish, Sica), 
in June 2004 at the Summit of central american 
Presidents. Sica held an “anti-mara Summit” in 
april 2005 where the presidents of all the central 
american nations were joined by representatives 
from mexico and the United States. more recently, 
the Spanish ministry of interior, with the participa-
tion of seven central and ten South american coun-
tries, plus mexico and the Dominican republic, met 
to discuss the issue in march 2006. in april 2006, 
the government of El Salvador met with the FBI for 
a very large anti-gang regional conference.12 
all in all, the region’s governments are now 
paying great attention to regional coordination, and 
many different U.S. departments and agencies have 
become involved. 
Impact of the Maras 
the maras present a serious threat to the democra-
cies, economies, and security of latin america. they 
overwhelm the governments, the police, and the legal 
systems with their sheer audacity, violence, and num-
bers. one telling statistic is that at least 60 percent of 
the 2,576 murders committed in el Salvador in 2004 
were gang-related, and the trend continued in 2005.13
Despite the governmental responses outlined 
above, the high level of violence and the difficulty 
Guatemalan women weep after the discovery of four dead members of an 
indigenous family, two of them minors, killed approximately 800 meters from 
the Guatemalan National Congress in the capital, 3 August 2006.
a
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these countries have in dealing with the maras raise 
serious questions about the governments’ ability to 
maintain law and order. For these new democracies, 
any challenge as strong as the maras aggravates 
already existing doubts about democracy as a 
viable, effective system of government. 
to be successful, a democracy must have legiti-
macy. latin america’s new democracies have not yet 
established the authority needed to earn legitimacy. 
Political elites in Guatemala and nicaragua, right up 
to the level of president, have been proven corrupt, and 
the two countries’ political systems function poorly. 
already challenged by historical and current prob-
lems, these new democracies now have to contend 
with maras that make a travesty of public services. 
in el Salvador, the maras have established small 
businesses. needless to say, they compete unfairly. 
they use violence against competitors, and they 
rent themselves out to other businesses, such as 
bus companies, to intimidate their competition. the 
maras’ behavior corrupts other businesses because 
it perpetuates itself and can result in a spiral of vio-
lence. Some who monitor maras wonder what they 
do with the money they make. they do not pay taxes, 
and their facilities and equipment are inexpensive. 
Will they buy up legitimate businesses and pay off 
government officials, including the police? 
el Salvador’s national Police believe that the 
maras are trying to penetrate police forces, non-
governmental organizations (nGos), and political 
groups. if this is accurate, it shows that the maras 
can think and act strategically. the concern is that 
they may further jeopardize democracy by making 
themselves available for hire to interest groups and 
radicals who have not been successful in the new 
democracies’ elections. 
“national security,” or, more precisely, the secu-
rity of the nation-state, refers to the safeguarding of 
the state’s sovereignty over the territory and popu-
lation within its borders, and implies that the state 
should have policies to confront any threat to that 
sovereignty. “Public security” connotes the main-
tenance of civil order necessary for basic societal 
functions (for example, commercial transactions, 
transportation, or communications) and the rule of 
law. “citizen security” alludes to the capacity of 
individuals and groups to enjoy or exercise their 
political, economic, and civil rights.14
the maras threaten all three security levels. 
citizens cannot go about their business without fear 
of being robbed or killed in their neighborhoods. 
Businesses such as commerce and transport are 
prevented from operating unless they pay off the 
maras. Whole sections of cities, such as Guatemala 
city and tegucigalpa, are under the control of maras, 
which, of course, fight each other for control of turf. 
When international organized crime employs maras, 
entire sections of countries, such as the Peten in 
Guatemala, slip from the state’s sovereign control. 
in sum, the maras pose serious challenges to all 
levels of security, to economic development, and 
to democratic consolidation. it cannot be empha-
sized enough how tentative and fragile these latin 
american political and economic systems are fol-
lowing decades of authoritarianism and internal 
conflict. It would not take much to destabilize them. 
Guatemala’s recent past provides a case in point. 
With their violence, networks, and emerging strat-
egies, maras can pose challenges that will be even 







Police officers detain gang members as part of a govern-
ment plan to crack down on violent youth gangs or ‘maras’ 
in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 14 April 2005 . 
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on their current ability to intimidate political parties 
and support radical groups. there are signs of this hap-
pening now, and if it works, given the maras’ ability 
to communicate and learn, more such outrages can be 
expected. the fear is that central america will go the 
way of colombia, with the loss of state control over 
great swaths of the country and the expansion of orga-
nized crime based on narcotics and terrorism. in cen-
tral america, unlike colombia, the threat is located in 
the urban areas, and is not due so much to government 
neglect as to a lack of resources. the motivation now 
appears to be present to do something. 
What to Do?
all central american countries want to respond to 
the maras in some meaningful way. Because the maras 
operate in a networked fashion, governments must do 
the same. It takes networks to fight networks.15 
the Sica-sponsored agreement among the 
central american nations (and the Dominican 
republic) commits each country to strengthen 
efforts against the maras by developing regional 
strategies for improving security, by sharing infor-
mation and intelligence, by creating a regional 
rapid reaction force with broad jurisdiction, and 
by creating programs to keep at-risk youths out of 
gangs.16 even so, implementation at a national or, 
even better, local level, requires overcoming such 
impediments as a lack of personnel, vague police 
powers, questionable legality/constitutionality, 
judicial unwillingness to enforce the laws, the legal 
systems’ vulnerability to intimidation and corrup-
tion, and criticism by Un entities and nGos.
Further, the merging of police and military/
national intelligence can be difficult because 
these organizations’ goals are often diametrically 
opposed: police want to prosecute criminals based 
on evidence gathered after a crime has been com-
mitted whereas national intelligence agencies 
attempt to provide warning of pending activity. 
this is not to say that police never attempt to dis-
rupt operations, or that military and governmental 
intelligence agencies do not reflect on past activity 
to support analysis; however, police want the legal 
means to take people to trial while national agen-
cies function  in a broader context. to make any 
headway against the maras, it will take focused 
effort, detailed intelligence-sharing agreements, 
the granting of broad jurisdictional authority to 
national and international forces, the incorporation 
of technology, and coordination among regional and 
international partners. 
to our knowledge, there is no credible evidence 
linking the maras to terrorism. this is clearly 
good news for the United States considering the 
ease with which gang members cross the borders 
into this country.17 Further, while the maras are a 
crime problem in cities across the United States, 
the situation in most of central america is much 
more serious because of a lower level of economic 
development and the fragility of the new democ-
racies and their institutions. as a result, in central 
america the maras challenge all levels of security 
and have the potential to frustrate economic devel-
opment and democratic consolidation. clearly, there 
is work to do at many levels of government to put 
best practices and policies into place to fight this 
growing threat. MR
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